Vichy, I’m not sure I entirely understand what you’re trying to say here. Is it that moral claims make statements about properties of actions (even other people’s actions), and not about properties of the moral evaluator, and that this is problematic?
Because, what is fundamental to moral discourse is the concept that morality is imperative, commanding, authoritative. That is what people typically mean, that is how they use it and that is, after all, why they are interested in moral discussions to begin with. Statements consciously rejecting the impossible 'categorical imperative' may make reference to moral ideas, but it can not properly be called 'moral discourse' and has no answer to those who differ in their evaluation of morality, or reject the concept as spurious altogether.[/i]

Hmm...what if we think of morality as making claims about the way that people come to decisions about what they will do? That is, what if when we say that someone acted wrongly, what we mean is that that we believe they didn't consider something that they should have considered, or that they didn't consider it in the way in which they should have considered it?

[quote="Danny Shahar"] If I didn't find it fulfilling to advance the state of philosophical discourse, I'd do something else, but not because I'd be denying the inherent value in it. quote]

I see value as both positive and negative where I think you see it as only positive. I might pay $100 dollars not to have to read so I can go scuba diving. (the fact I don't have to pay is not important) In that instance reading has a value of -$100.
I think by seeing it this way you might graph reading on a graph over time and the value will shift. You could only talk about a mean value over time which to me cannot be said to be "inherent". I also find it meaningless to say I value the action of the non-reading I did while scuba diving unless I can say that reading can have a negative value. You only positively value the reading you do and not he concept of reading its self.

Well you can certainly value being free of something; I value the absence of having my butt kicked, for example. Generally, I'd want to talk about a "negative" value in terms of the positive valuation of a negation of something -- so I value something's absence, rather than "negatively" valuing it. But that's a semantic issue. I'm not sure how the quote you picked out is in tension with that idea...

[Edit: Scratch what was here before. Read this on inherent value.]

Not exactly, because I don't think that "dislike" and "valuing" are linguistically identical. I mean, a value seems like it has something to do with motivating action or choice. That is, you probably value not getting your butt kicked because you dislike having your butt kicked, but there could be other reasons why you would value not getting your butt kicked. Like we might imagine that you're actually a masochist, so you like getting your butt kicked, but you are worried that people will look down upon you if you get your butt kicked, so you value not having it kicked (though perhaps only instrumentally). That might be a clumsy example, but hopefully the point makes sense.

If not, perhaps it might help to point out that dislike seems to be a purely self-referencing sort of feeling, whereas valuation need not be.

When I talk about intrinsic value, I don't mean that the cardinal amount that the thing is valued is a property of that object. I mean that the object is valued for itself, rather than as a means for something else.

I hold that ultimately one can only appreciate oneself or his/her feelings. One can never know the other except through the filter of ones self. Thus the only thing of value is ones own feelings. Feeling have intrinsic value to the feeler and everything else cannot by my view.

Thus the only thing of value is ones own feelings. Feeling have intrinsic value to the feeler and everything else cannot by my view.
Basically agreed. People, if they want to have real philosopical discussions, need to realise that values are nothing but a bias. Liberty, happiness, food and life are all BIASES. And as long as people don't recognize that, and realise that no one and nothing is externally 'relevant' will they make progress.

As far as I'm concerned, the mass of mankind is almost fordoomed by their evolutionary heritage. The classic 'robots overthrow the human race' would be a lot more practiable for those of us who value rationality and ecoomy. If the terminators killed off the human race and took over...they friggin' deserve it. The human race is retarded. Because of the nature of, you know, reality...we have three choices - become post-human cyborgs, get taken over by post-human computers, or die because we're too stupid and short-sighted to take either of the previous paths. The simple fact is that basic human biology is not consistent with material reality. Which means the human race is ultimately fucked. Which is no surprise with anyone whose done research into rationality.

Example: Human beings are equalitarian. Reality is best dealt with by cybernetics systems (maximal adaptation to individual circumstances). Thus equalitarianism is incompatible with reality.

Human beings have notions about maximizing liberty. But reality allows no liberty except in ratio to power. Thus liberty is incompatible with reality.

Human beings evolved for an environment of group selection and direct cooperation. In an environment of individual productivity and indirect coordination (civilization) human social values will be inevitably frustrated.

In terms of the sort of rational individual society, human beings are congential faluires. They're screwed. I can't emphasize this strongly enough - the mass of the human race, and their basic values, are anti-reality, anti-survival and anti-happiness. Anyone who looks forward to a reality without these problems is going to have to accept that the most commonly and deeply 'cherished' values of the human race are mentally retarded.[/i]

Vichy, saying that reality is "best" dealt with by cybernetic systems is obviously an instance of bias too. The egalitarian would almost certainly want to argue that "being maximally adapted to one's individual circumstances" is not the whole of what it means to deal with reality in the best way.

The idea that reality allows no liberty except in ratio to power is simply going to be an application of your definition of "power." If power is merely a characteristic of the individual, as distinguished from the individual's physical and social context, then the statement is going to be false: a football player's effective liberty is likely to be decreased when I have a gun, though the power that he can exercise upon the world will remain unchanged. So if by power you mean the range of alternatives that a person can implement all things considered, then it seems obvious that the identification with effective liberty is captured in the definition. "Maximizing" effective liberty would be an exercise in maximizing power.

But maximizing power is not incompatible with reality, except to the extent that it's not clear what it would mean to "maximize" power, just like it's not clear what it would mean to "maximize" liberty. The maximization language usually comes from the view that power or liberty is a good thing and therefore ought to be promoted or fostered, and charges of imprecision will likely be fair here. But saying that the goal of "maximizing liberty" is phrased imprecisely and is in need of clarification is sort of different from saying that maximizing liberty is incompatible with reality.

One thing that puzzles me about your points on rationality and economy is that people value rationality and economy because of their capacity for improving our lives. They're not values in themselves, as far as I can tell. In fact, it's not even entirely clear what rationality and economy would mean in the absence of people.

An unfeeling, unbiased, perfectly economizing, totally rational robot would immediately realize that there was no point to doing anything, and just sit around. You can't economize without ends, and the robot would have no ends since, as you pointed out, ends are just biases (that is, they reflect values, which is the same thing). If your "post-human computers" are to be motivated to take over the world at all, it seems like they would need to be a biased group themselves (otherwise, why take over the world?).

Vichy, saying that reality is "best" dealt with by cybernetic systems is obviously an instance of bias too. The egalitarian would almost certainly want to argue that "being maximally adapted to one's individual circumstances" is not the whole of what it means to deal with reality in the best way.
Sure. I mean that cybernetic adaptivity (this http://www.panarchy.org/ashby/variety.1956.html and not this ) seems to be objectively functional for teleological entities. Since there is no external way to evaluate ends against one another, and since all action involves functioning and surviving within diverse and uncertain physical circumstances, cybernetic adaptation is required for any sort of functionality. It's the same thing as the maligned material acquisition, in a way - a person who denigrates physical goods is ignoring the fact that his or her body is a physical good. Ideas and ideals can not exist without that substrate. Any system which goes against cybernetics or materialism will ultimately end up acting in screwy, confused, incompatible ways - like people do - because even the 'non-material' ends are directly reliant upon the cybernetic and materialist adaptations they scorn.

a football player's effective liberty is likely to be decreased when I have a gun, though the power that he can exercise upon the world will remain unchanged.
Power is subjective in the sense that it's the ability to acquire psychic profit. Having 'power' that isn't actually useful to you - for example, if I could choose to cook for a German eatery, something I have no desire to do, my effective power has not increased. Power, like value, can not be conceived of as separate from the ends of a particular actor.

An unfeeling, unbiased, perfectly economizing, totally rational robot would immediately realize that there was no point to doing anything, and just sit around.
What I'm talking about is more this: many people have goals and values that are incompatible with being able to achieve not only other, but principally all, values. Egalitarianism is my favourite example - literally false (except trivially) and also contrary to the most important basic feature of a system which would function in material reality - cybernetic adaptivity. Much of the damage done by the denial-of-capitalism can be phrased in the sense of eleminating requisite variety in material systems (including labor), and since the world does not care what we think, attempting to undermine this only results in people - and the 'system' of connections, capital and externalities that it generates - getting screwed over.

I'm just luvin' this interplay.

- NonE

Jeez...that article was pretty difficult to understand...the Wikipedia article isn't much more accessible either...

Tell me if I'm getting this right:

1) According to the cybernetic view, intervention into one's environment is based on a perception that a set of "disturbing" factors will impact the current state of existence in a way that will produce an anticipated outcome (as measured by a single metric variable) unless one intervenes, and that one's intervention is perceived to avert that outcome in favor of a more desired outcome by introducing another "regulatory" factor into the system by intervening.

2) The intervenor's actions are determined by its perceptions of the "disturbing" factors coupled with the intervenor's exogenous motivations. Accordingly, variety in the intervenor's actions will necessarily be the result of differences in the intervenor's perceptions of the "disturbing" factors that act upon the existing state of affairs (and perhaps some process -- not discussed -- where the intervenor's motivations are altered over time).

3) The extent to which the intervenor can have an impact on the outcome in question is the extent to which the intervenor can act as a channel of causation for the "disturbing" factors (via the intervenor's perception of the "disturbing" factors plus the intervenor's exogenous desires producing the intervention which impacts the outcome).

If this is what's going on here, then a) I don't see how this relates to what we've been talking about; b) I don't see how the conclusions at the bottom have anything to do with anything; c) this seems like a far too simplistic account of how people make decisions, in the sense that in order for the theory to not be blatantly false the terms in question would have to be defined so loosely as to capture almost anything, which would render the system useless; and d) this just sounds like a (not very good) decision theory; why is it important?

Phlogiston, sorry I didn't respond directly to your comment earlier. Feelings may be the only thing that can be intrinsically pleasurable for a person, but I think that we directly experience valuing things besides feelings all the time (e.g., our loved ones' wellbeing, peace in foreign countries, an end to world hunger, the integrity of the rainforest). It may be that these things are connected with our feelings, but we value them for what they are, and not because of how they make us feel (though perhaps if they didn't make us feel that way, we wouldn't value them).