In my classes this week I thought about Stefan a couple of times

1. two guys in a class tend to start sentences with 'I feel...', so like 'I feel that Menger doesn't realize what kind of epistemological problems are involved'
And every time in my head I involuntarily go 'That's not a feeling!'

2. One of the great great things about this grad programme is the criticism. Everything and everybody gets criticised and analysed and you learn an awful lot from that. and I was thinking; Stefan simply wouldn't last a semester in a programme like this. Suppose he gives a presentation on UPB, then he will be criticised from all sort of perspectives in the discussion afterwards and he simply wouldnt be able to deal with this, to talk his way out of it. He totally depends on the controlled environment he has created with FDR.

3. Stefan has very strong opinions about such diverse topics as ethics, science, epistemology, free will, mathematics (his empiricist interpretation) etc. and he and the hard-core FDR'ers (perhaps with the exception of the free will debate) ridicule their opponents and are utterly convinced that they simply have the correct answers in all these fields and that their opponents or criticasters are simply dumb or irrationally defensive. But dude, the most brilliant minds of all time have analysed, thought through, argued for or against virtually all possible positions in these discussions and Stefan c.s. simply have no idea about this. I mean, Stef's philosophy of science is a position that I think literally not a single philosopher of science still takes seriously after the work of Polanyi, Kuhn, Quine etc. But Stefan is completely unaware of this whole development, of all the (I think definitive) arguments against his crude proto-positivism. but he is so certain about his position, so friggin' arrogant.
And tey have their little simplistic, sophistic 'self-detonating argument!' techniques and they refuse to think beyond their trickery. And when confronted with the fact that the most brilliant minds have thought about these things, that so many books and articles have been written about it, they would likely just dismiss it by saying 'Ha! A bunch of academics don't agree? We'll take that as a badge of honor'


They're really such a sad little bunch

I get the impression, whenever I read their arrogant rants, that they believe everyone who disagrees with them must actually be stupid. I suppose there is no worse approach to philosophy of any kind than to assume that your intellectual opponents are simply morons.

Awhile back, Russ Roberts interviewed Steve Fazzari, a Keynesian economist, on his podcast EconTalk. It's a great interview, not just because Roberts is such an engaging interviewer, but also because Fazzari is remarkably smart. I was a little surprised at how impossible it was for me to always work out what was incorrect about his models.

The positions that the FDR group refute are not articulated by the Fazzaris of the world. They are barely articulated at all. Molyneux creates nonsensical caricatures of whomever he disagrees with. And like you pointed out, those caricatures are often a century or more out of date.

An analogy: from what I gathered the Republicans in their campaigning and in their propagandizing used a remarkably cynical technique; they would knowingly spread lies and false information about their projects, about their opponents and so on, and when journalists or others would call them on these lies and so on they would simply not care; they don't care about truth or about being found out by journalists, intellectual or political opponents etc. because the revelation that what they said were lies would only reach a very small part of the population while their lies would reach vastly more people. So they didn't mind being found out, their lies being exposed because their lies got the job done, they would convince enough people for them to stay in power and that is all that mattered.

that's a deeply deeply cynical approach, but I do see some aspects of that in Stefan as well: in a sense it doesn't matter for him when he gets exposed re certain points on the board or in discussions by intellectual opponents. He will ban or ridicule his opponents, for sure, but he doesnt mind being found out much because by that time his lies will have done the trick of convincing enough of his followers of the truth of his position or of the nasty nature of his opponents. he truly does not care about truth.
That too is deeply deeply cynical

He does that to set an example of what happens to dissenters. I think he is blatant about it when he is caught in a lie in order to make it clear that you don't call him on his dishonesty or contradictions. The more glaringly obvious the error on his part, the more effective it is when he lambastes and ultimately ex-communicates the messenger. That's how they learn how to behave around the Great One.

I think you've pointed out one of the best arguments that Roberts made against Farrazi in the podcast. He hesitated for a moment, and then suggested that Farrazi's argument meant that whether people saved or invested didn't make a difference. He didn't really press the issue, though.

I find it confusing for two reasons. The first is that, intuitively and on a personal scale, it seems to me that savings should have a positive, if deferred, effect. Your interpretation of Farrazi's argument, if correct, suggests that saving and investment just moves money around in the current economy.

The second is that Farrazi does offer a refutation. He asks what would happen if, absurdly, everyone saved instead of spent. I think I understand why that simply wouldn't ever happen (because investment money would become absurdly cheap in such a situation, promoting borrowing and consumption) but it does suggest that there is some qualitative difference between spending and savings.

I don't understand what your post means, Conrad. Therefore it must be wrong.

if there are more savings then there will be more investments, and thus a lengthening and widening of the structure of production and thus more jobs in the higher order stages of production (and fewer jobs in those stages closest to consumption)

Doesn't it depend on what we mean by "saving"? One of my economics professors once insisted that "saving" means putting money in the bank (which, I argued, is more like "loaning" than "saving," but whatever). "Saving" as in keeping money in one's own posession, on the other hand, was now "hoarding."

The difference is important. If everyone "saved" in my professor's sense, and didn't spend, it wouldn't be profitable for banks to continue to exist. They wouldn't be able to generate any profit from lending, because who would take out money if not to spend? And without that profit, why offer an interest rate on deposits? If everyone "saved" and didn't spend, it would soon become impossible to "save" at all. Such a system would self-detonate.

If, however, we take saving to mean "hoarding," then things are different. If everyone "hoarded" and didn't spend, there would simply be no trade. In such a case, people would just have to sustain themselves without the benefits afforded by the division of labor.

I read this yesterday and it kind of reminded me of my interactions with Stefan and his cohort.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/mozart.html