UPB - show me the error of my understanding

NonEntity · Number of posts: 2598 Registration date: 2007-11-08

I know that is the source of it, I'm just wondering how anyone with any kind of rational thought could support such an idea. Are there others here who do? It just seems blatantly insane, and I keep seeing it here and there.

I guess I'm asking the question because it seems SO over-the-edge that I feel as though I must be missing something, yet I can't see what it is that I'm missing.

- NonE

{edit} Oops. I guess that I don't understand what this means:

Quote:

tefan has declared that morality only apples to 'violently inflicted preferences' so that the non-moral option is removed.

reddeerrick · Number of posts: 431 Location: Red Deer, Alberta Registration date: 2007-10-17

Well if you're evaluating an action with regards to morality, you would try to determine if it was moral, immoral, or none of the above, right? Stefan says that he already knows which types of actions concern morality, so when evaluating those, you need not consider 'none of the above'.

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reddeerrick · Number of posts: 431 Location: Red Deer, Alberta Registration date: 2007-10-17

It's classic question-begging

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Static4367

Can anyone point to where Stef derives the conclusion that "violent" acts are inherently subject to moral evaluation?

I agree he uses this framework all the time, but does he ever try to justify it?

Conrad

Danny Shahar wrote:

Lizzard, if the universality requirement in Stefan's theory operated the way that you seem to suggest that it does, then what Stefan would be arguing is this:

In order for any inflicted behavior to be morally permissible, it would need to be morally obligatory for all people to be performing it at all times, regardless of the circumstances.

one could also say that it at least should be possible for whoever wants to be moral to do that at whatever point, so then the logical conclusion is that it should be possible (not compulsory) for everybody to be good at the same time

Phlogiston · Number of posts: 621 Location: NOLA Registration date: 2007-10-25

blackacidlizzard wrote:

So the fact that soldiers initiate violence which directly leads to deaths of people they claim to be protecting is not empirical evidence? How tight does the causality have to be? Or is causality not allowed in empirical evaluation?

The fact they didn't protect is empirical evidence that the soldiers failed to acccomplish their goal. It doesn't say it won't work but only that it won't always work.

Is the fact that I put my crossbow down so as not to shoot you and
it goes off and kills you empirical evidence against NAP? Just as much I would think.

Danny Shahar · Number of posts: 948 Registration date: 2007-12-30

Static, unfortunately I sent my hard copy of the book home with my parents when they came to visit, and my computer just crashed, so I don't have access to the electronic copy either. But I do have my notes from the relevant section of the book here:
http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/2008/01/tmp-14-from-avoidance-to-ethics.html

It seems like the point that Stefan is trying to make is this: Because non-inflicted behaviors are avoidable, it is possible for a person to do what is aesthetically undesirable without forcing anything on a person besides the unpleasantness of having to react to aesthetically undesirable behavior. Stefan's emphasis on violence as the defining characteristic of inflicted behavior suggests that what Stefan has in mind is that aesthetically undesirable behaviors offend the sensibilities of their victims, but do them no physical harm. This is a distinction captured in Mill's On Liberty, and was also discussed in a really interesting essay by Andrew Altman called "Speech Codes and Expressive Harms." Basically, it's like the "sticks and stones" idea: only physical invasions count as harms, whereas everything else is just "unpleasantness" of some kind or another [Altman calls this idea into question because, he points out, some verbal attacks are much more harmful to their victims than physical attacks which do count as harms, and do not reflect the ideals we try to protect when we advocate freedom of speech].

This distinction becomes rather shaky, however, when dealing with things like property rights and contracts. Stefan's account of property rights does not sufficiently ground a claim that damaging one's possessions is violence done to a person, and if I recall correctly, Stefan specifically cites lying as being in the realm of aesthetic behavior, which calls into question what he would say about a broken contract.

In passing, I'll note that building the theory this way also creates tensions for issues involving risk and liability (as was touched on in our discussion about smashing the window), as it seems to require that we build compound behaviors into our maxims (like smashing the window and paying compensation if it's desired), but that's another discussion, I think.

Static4367

Danny Shahar wrote:

Static, unfortunately I sent my hard copy of the book home with my parents when they came to visit, and my computer just crashed, so I don't have access to the electronic copy either. But I do have my notes from the relevant section of the book here:
http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/2008/01/tmp-14-from-avoidance-to-ethics.html

It seems like the point that Stefan is trying to make is this: Because non-inflicted behaviors are avoidable, it is possible for a person to do what is aesthetically undesirable without forcing anything on a person besides the unpleasantness of having to react to aesthetically undesirable behavior. Stefan's emphasis on violence as the defining characteristic of inflicted behavior suggests that what Stefan has in mind is that aesthetically undesirable behaviors offend the sensibilities of their victims, but do them no physical harm. This is a distinction captured in Mill's On Liberty, and was also discussed in a really interesting essay by Andrew Altman called "Speech Codes and Expressive Harms." Basically, it's like the "sticks and stones" idea: only physical invasions count as harms, whereas everything else is just "unpleasantness" of some kind or another [Altman calls this idea into question because, he points out, some verbal attacks are much more harmful to their victims than physical attacks which do count as harms, and do not reflect the ideals we try to protect when we advocate freedom of speech].

This distinction becomes rather shaky, however, when dealing with things like property rights and contracts. Stefan's account of property rights does not sufficiently ground a claim that damaging one's possessions is violence done to a person, and if I recall correctly, Stefan specifically cites lying as being in the realm of aesthetic behavior, which calls into question what he would say about a broken contract.

In passing, I'll note that building the theory this way also creates tensions for issues involving risk and liability (as was touched on in our discussion about smashing the window), as it seems to require that we build compound behaviors into our maxims (like smashing the window and paying compensation if it's desired), but that's another discussion, I think.

I agree that what is judged violent is very fuzzy. I think what is judged "inflicted" is also very fuzzy.

Say we agree to a boxing match and during the course of the match I break your jaw. Is that inflicted? You agreed to participate in the match but you certainly didn't expect to be seriously injured when you did so. Perhaps I should have told you that I am very good at boxing, but perhaps you should have told me that you are not very good.

My point is that if we all had perfect information every "infliction" would be avoidable. There is some standard of reasonable inconvenience that has to be worked for all situations in order for the framework to function.

Likewise, Stef has not explained where responsibility begins and ends in a chain of causality. If Stef pays taxes that pay for a military that kills innocent people in a foreign country, is he not guilty of enabling that crime? He would say that the taxes are taken by threat of force so he is not responsible, but that is a ridiculous excuse. If I demand $500 so I could buy a gun and kill his wife, and threatened to put him in jail if he refused, would he agree? Of course not. Stef could also refuse to pay taxes and suffer the consequences or he could move to another country. Again there is a standard of reasonableness that is very fuzzy that I just don't think can be worked out in any logical or empirical way.

In other words:

I agree that any maxim based approach just becomes a big circus.

(By the way, I am also Greg who commented on your blog. I can't remember if the window smashing conversation you referenced was on the blog or on the FDR board. )

Conrad

BlackAcidLizzard,

how has this thread been working for you so far? Has it helped you re your assessment and understanding and evaluation of UPB, or do you think the essential aspects have not been touched upon yet? If the latter, can you say more about what you think those are and how it would be best to address them?

blackacidlizzard · Number of posts: 188 Registration date: 2008-05-21

This has been quite helpful.
It's going to take me awhile to examine some things to properly understand the challenges presented here. I have some preliminary thoughts on some aspects (the possible uselessness of argumentation ethics in some circumstances and the discussion about maxims, in particular), but I do not think I fully understand them in relation to UPB. I will be cross referencing the arguments here with a re-reading of UPB, working out some things, and post my understandings when I have them.

Danny:

I fully agree that in a situation where soldiers kill only other soldiers, or where students volunteer for a course of study which includes physical attack that these actions are fully morally acceptable due to the voluntary choice. I also believe UPB supports this.
I disagree that "status" is relevant, but this is one of those questions I will need to examine more fully.

This will take me awhile.
Much thanks to all of you for all the feedback.

Conrad

cool, dude.

although i am still confused about UPB I am less so than I was before this thread started as you clarified some things and as i was forced to think through more things.

anyhoo, please feel free to jump in any time again on this or other topics

Danny Shahar · Number of posts: 948 Registration date: 2007-12-30

The reason status becomes important is that in extreme situations, it is sometimes acceptable for us to engage in inflicted behaviors which are normally impermissible. If being in an extreme situation cannot be morally relevant, then Stefan is forced into the position that he actually does take regarding gray areas, but which I rejected earlier. That is, that certain behaviors are morally wrong, but sometimes it might be acceptable to perform them anyway.

I should emphasize that this route is not inconsistent or self-defeating. It's just that if we take it, we end up with a moral theory that's almost completely devoid of any precision. Further, we end up with a moral theory which is less precise than alternative moral theories which have the same structure and method of evaluating ethical claims. We would be, in effect, handcuffing ourselves in order to adhere to an unusually strict requirement for universality which, I should add, has no basis or justification, and which can safely be rejected without doing any harm to the overall theory. And to take it another step, I think that rejecting the strict universality requirement would actually produce a much more plausible account of morality. It simply isn't true that we all have the same properties at all time and places, and that a behavior which is obligatory in one situation must be obligatory in all situations, regardless of any circumstances. I think I successfully showed why circumstances did need to be a part of Stefan's theory in the previously linked post from my blog, and I think that rejecting my claims would only prove detrimental to the theory as a whole.

In any case, I'm glad I could help, and I'm glad to see that someone who buys into Stefan's theory was finally willing to come forward and talk about it. It's been a pleasure, and I hope to hear more from you soon.

[P.S. If by "status," you meant something like "title," then I think you're right. If individuals are not in a voluntary situation in which certain individuals are given certain rights which others don't have, then it's unclear how a person's title could give them any new rights. For example, a Zen master can't just go around whipping random people because he's a Zen master. He gains new rights only so far as others give them up to him voluntarily. As Rousseau famously pointed out, when ten people get together and unanimously agree to something, they do not acquire the right to impose it on an eleventh.]

Conrad

'In any case, I'm glad I could help, and I'm glad to see that someone who buys into Stefan's theory'

nice one with the gentle phrasing there dude. :-)

Better to say 'who agrees with'. I mean, if he 'bought into it' he wouldn't be here discussing it. Or is this a more neutral term in English?

Danny Shahar · Number of posts: 948 Registration date: 2007-12-30

Sorry, I didn't mean any offense by it: I use those terms interchangeably. I apologize if there's any implication that there's something wrong with buying into a theory; I certainly didn't mean to suggest anything like that.

Conrad

yeah, I didnt think you did, (and should have added that to my post) but just to be sure I thought I'd point it out