I want to comment on both your posts:
First of all, Stewart, you're not in the way and I appreciate anybody on this board commenting, the more the merrier.
In essence I agree that most people, in any society, have a strong sense of reciprocity, restraint and even benevolence if strong interests of theirs are not at stake. However if they believe vital interests of theirs are at stake, especially if they have learned uncivil, authoritarian or irrational behaviours. Many people, as we well know, have turned to death-dealers despite the non-threatening nature of their targets.
The solution to this problem is to have external forces (esp. other people) which counter-balance what profits might be gained from agression. (Ctd)

Now on to Stewart: I agree that 'most reasonable people will agree' is prima facie questionable, and that requires some justification before it becomes reasonable. But I think that the answer is the benefits of existing in a private property society and the immense dangers of violation. The fact is that right now the vast majority of all interactions on this Earth are between unarmed civilians making almost unenforceable contracts; and that social stigmas and economic incentives are for most persons an inescapable scissor.
Ideologic-Moral absolutes suffer from two problems, 1) they are false; 2) they ingraine a habit of personality subjection to ideas (rather than subjection of ideas to the person); 3) any badly supported idea is liable to be replaced, insofar as 2 applies the quality and coherence of the replacing idea becomes less important than the psychological incentives for accepting it and 4) Many ideologies feed recursively upon a fear of outside ideas, moreso when the ideology is (ctd)

viewed as the hallmark, in fact the foundation, of whatever is considered 'desireable' by those who hold it. Christianity is an example. As Joseph Campbell said to the Christian sinner, "What would you do? You're not a danger to society". In a society without state or ideology, how could anyone ever get enough social leverage to engage in widespread violence? A defense of libertarian ideology if succesful may lead to a great place to live, but it will not eleminate the fundamental danger of ideology; the human race has prospered with no consistent ideology over millions of years; forming extra-legal and informal standards by market forces during a time in which the vast majority were ignorant, brutalized and told authoritarian, irrational and degrading ideological content; or perhaps more to the point if tommorow the myth of government was rejected by all, and everyone became a nihilistic hedonist, do you think us amoralists would suddenly forget the civil society which we live in? 0-Moral>Stupid Morals

Stewart, fair enough.

Reminds me a little of when David Friedman came to my school for a philosophy conference to present a paper on anarcho-capitalism. I objected that his account was neutral to issues of justice; he saw no reason to be concerned with the fact that injustice could potentially arise on a systemic scale, and his hypothetical social structure had no machinery for dealing with that sort of thing (get it? machinery?). His response was something along the lines of "Well, if you can get everyone to believe in your religion, then great!" Luckily, in thinking about institutional design, expected outcomes are centrally important, and so people like me don't necessarily need to argue with the consequentialists.

See, I'm a bit of a technological post-humanist/transhumanist, and I think at a certain point (and I admit I don't know when) that capital and technology will reach a point where statism will be impossible to coordinate and no one will fall for blatant emotivism and muddled reasoning.
The main hope I see before that is the rising of a neo-bourgouesie; economically, socially and intellectually differing in interests with the state-vested classes; should such a class arise (say, from all the Bureaucrash kids and whatnot) a second resurgance of liberalism on anywhere near the scale of classical liberalism will break the state; another industrial revolution is simply beyond the power of those professionally conservative ideologues to adapt to and overcome.

The first claim (though I think it is generally solid, if not 'Singularity' true) is based upon basic observations about communication and knowledge, IE it should not be controversial that Data's just going to laugh at Keynesian economics. But I do not think it is feasible to predict when this will happen, nor even ensure that we will make it that far (though I think we will).

The second is slightly related, but not so much dependent on human improvement directly but by improving individual wealth and civil society to a point where Statism simply will not be able to catch its growth (supposing, as I said, a resurgent liberalism with popular support). The possibility of a 2nd liberal-market boom is enhanced by its obvious utility to human beings; and I wouldn't be surprised if it was soon (for historical and other reasons) but it remains another outlet which may well lead into the original one.

One of my dreams (which will probably go unfulfilled thanks to the Capital Eating Monsters) is to witness that period of time, when human civilization finally purges barbarism and anti-rationalism. I sort of imagine it as a collective sigh, "Ah. About time!"

I also sometimes feel like a bit of an oddball libertarian since I don't attach importance to natural rights or any other sort of morality.

The thing is, most libertarians I know will say "you cannot have libertarian theory without a theory of morality" (meaning that nobody will be persuaded w/out it). They seem to use the unsupported assertion that morality is "essential," as an axiom.

I find that when people say something is "essential," as an axiom it is usually a belief with a weak foundation. Think of "we need government," or "people will be evil without church," &c.

Consequentialism is actually the only thing absolutely indespensible to spreading ideology... think of all the most moralistic libertarians: does even one of them think fiat iustitia pareat mundus? I don't think you can convince many people except those with monkish, aschetic dispositions to adopt something without consequentialism


I also think libertarians for the most part, though they honor his writings, have ignored some of AJ Nock's most important ideas. I'll create a separate post on that point later when I'm able to better organize my thoughts on it.

I find it easier to simply not call myself a libertarian.

The thing is, most libertarians I know will say "you cannot have libertarian theory without a theory of morality"
Interesting in light of the fact that property and liberty all exist because of, and can best be developed by, completely non-moral factors involving conflict resolution, planning and expectations. We build the market order because we're smart, not because we're given to insights about the mind of god or something. Every time someone says, "if there were no morality, why everything would be permissible" by answers are threefold; 1. That's not my fault, 2. it's a moral presumption to assert there is something 'wrong' with the lack of morality and 3. most people develop their moral sense based on what is approved of and beneficial to them and their cohorts. An amoral society is stable for the same reason our chaotically-moraled society has stability, because the presumption of liberty and property exist for very good reasons and have for a very long time. THey never seem to get that objecting that a lack of morality could lead to 'immoral conduct' is precisely the same, logically, as saying that if everyone believes in fairies there will be quite a lot of stupid theories about fairies and if no one believes in fairies we'd all behave with no respect for the concept of fairydom.

I think Vichy, we're getting even further into the realm of "What is Morality?", rather than escaping it because you seem to focus here on the external morals that are often arbitrary (from bibles, culture, etc..), whereas there is another whole side of morality which has to do with the morals one can discover for oneself. And not just instinctual moral-center-of-the-brain morals either. But then again, you're probably an epistemological amoralist, so perhaps as they say: that is that.

Maybe my comment is more directed to T.E.M. then as he suggests:

"I find that when people say something is "essential," as an axiom it is usually a belief with a weak foundation. Think of "we need government," or "people will be evil without church," &c."

As I see it, Libertarianism is generally considered a political position, as well as a philosophical, economic, or social one. As such, it makes a claim of some sort as to what we 'ought' to do or not do. As such, it is a moral claim.

This isn't the same as saying "church is essential", but is rather a prerequisite to a discussion of any kind concerning how people might organize themselves to cooperate, share resources, organize around power, etc.. just as logic is a prerequisite to argument.

Such a discussion could of course conclude the there is no 'ought' about it, but it seems to me it must reference it if it is to be political. Hence, it must reference morality.

Such a discussion could of course conclude the there is no 'ought' about it, but it seems to me it must reference it if it is to be political. Hence, it must reference morality.
False. The presumption of liberty derives from the impossibility of proving an empirical negative, IE "That I should not be prevented from acting in a certain way." Those that seek to prevent, as a matter of sheer epistemology, are required to make a relevant claim as to why interference with a liberty should go on. To discuss politics is simply to discuss whether the arguments in favor of intervention are valid ones, and whether political ideologies are themselves coherent, meaningful and correct. Liberty is not something that needs to be defended, or nor property 'justified' by 'first appropriation'; the epistemology of who the burden of proof falls on indicates that a positive reason must be demonstrates for the interference.
The tendency to moralize then, by libertarians, is simply a result of moralizing and nothing else. It demonstrates nothing, at least nothing that does not presume a prior succeptibility to the particulars of the argument. And it is uneccessary and, perhaps, irrelevant to questions of Justice and State. Moralities strongest precepts are, in fact, largely solutions to problems in engaging the division-of-labor, the rest of it is usually holdover nonsense from a primate past; like stoning people who break non-tort taboos.

Vichy, my question would be why the presumption of liberty you justified on semantic grounds would carry moral weight. That is, why would I need to "justify" my "interference?" And why use the word "interference" in the first place? It seems to suggest that the "interfered-with" had primacy of action, and the "interferer" is just modifying that state. But the interferer's actions can coherently be discussed separately, as the implementation of the interferer's own plans. Why, then, would the interferer need to justify her actions? I don't believe the answer lies in the structuring of claims.