I'm not entirely sure what point you're trying to make. Obviously liberal gun banners try to use the kind of reasoning which applies to legitimate rules of social coexistence, because they're trying to justify making rules of their own. Your argument is basically like saying that "You want dinner?! That's the sort of thing that Hitler would want in this situation! Fascist!"

Freedom and voluntarity must be considered both from an individual and from a social perspective. For the individual, freedom and voluntarity are constrained to the extent that we enforce things like property rights and laws governing right of way. But individuals are protected from coercion by others when these rules are enforced, thereby expanding their effective freedom. If we are all free to do whatever we want, you are as free to enslave me as I am to resist your efforts.

I understand the desire to say, "Freedom is good, so therefore we must maximize freedom." But as political philosophers, we don't have it in our power to do something like that. We cannot, without restricting freedom, control the individuals who would interfere with the freedom of their neighbors.

The question is how we should think about constraints on freedom in a society. Pacifists will argue that we should not be the ones doing the constraining, thereby leaving the door open to those who would disrespect their neighbors' claims (whether or not those claims are justified). But that doesn't seem like it's the only way to proceed, and certainly doesn't entail any maximization of freedom.

In most communities, rules like property rights and right-of-way conventions enable people to exercise more effective freedom than they would have in other systems. This is because individuals can more effectively plan and execute their actions when they don't have to constantly deal with the possibility that they will be impeded (this was Hayek's point in The Constitution of Liberty). Social rules are constraints, but they are predictable constraints -- unlike the constraints which can be imposed by unconstrained neighbors.

To my knowledge, no society has ever existed without some form of legislation (or set of customs which acted as a sort of cultural legislation), and for good reason. Such a society would be anarchy in the most pejorative sense of the word. You can cite medieval Iceland, present day Somalia, or whatever other example you would like, and I will show you how those cultures had rules for governing their societies. It is of critical importance that you realize that the anarchist does not respond to Hobbes' characterization of "the jungle" by saying, "But life in the jungle would be great!" Rather, the anarchist responds by suggesting that centralized state authority is not necessary for the creation and enforcement of the institutions and rules that are needed for the functioning of society. The difference between those two kinds of argument is foundational.

And what happens if people fail to voluntarily uphold their end of an agreement arrived at in a negotiation? What if people refuse to negotiate, or are blatantly unreasonable in their demands? Do we just completely let things slide? Or do we do something about it? If the answer is to prohibit the offender from our property by threat of force, then that's a form of enforcement. If we level scorn upon her, that's enforcement. If we tell everyone to be wary of trusting her in the future, that's enforcement. Enforcement is at the core of how every society works, and how every society must work. Without it, you simply couldn't have any semblance of civility.

So you are suggesting that Utopia IS possible? Is that it? Sorry man. I'll not support your belief that some people are better than others and have a right to rule over them. It makes no sense. It is internally contradictory.

I get along very nicely, thank you, without threatening those I engage with. And I have found that often it is better off all the way around to simply walk away than to try and force my viewpoint on another, especially if involving "the state" is part of the equation. No one wins there but the bureaucrats and lawyers.

- NonE (apparently lacking any semblance of civility)

Don't you see that it's you who's talking about utopia? I'm saying that people benefit from rules and conventions that help them to resolve disputes, and to know how disputes would be resolved if they arose. You're saying that people don't need rules, or don't need to enforce rules, because people will simply find a way to get along without them without recourse to violence. Your position sounds a little bit more utopian than mine.

Further, I'm not sure that I can think of a single significant political philosopher who has ever agreed with you. That's not to say that you must be wrong. But you seem to be under the impression that my position is completely ridiculous, and that your view is common sense. It isn't. You really need to offer more of an argument.

So, Phlog, you, too, are joining into the supposition that there are certain humans who are of some higher form than all others, and who therefore have a greater grasp of truth and fairness and are not subject to temptation and power lust and so on and can therefore be seen as gods by all of the other lowly slime called regular people?

- NonE

No, that's not it at all! The authority by which I can hold you to certain standards is the same authority which you possess to hold me to them as well. Legislation doesn't require a god for a legislator. Rules can be set by unanimous agreement, by traditional convention, or by the mandate of a recognized authority in a society where such authority is respected by those affected by it. [Edit: For example, in the Somali customary law you cited earlier, legislation is passed down from the elders representing the victim and the accused, whose authority is drawn from a rich cultural tradition which is respected by the participants.]

The point isn't that the need for rules entitles us to subjugate others. The point is that the need for rules gives us a reason to work together to form them. These are the inconveniences of Locke's state of nature which led him to see the necessity of the state. Subsequent thinkers have argued that a state need not be the organ for addressing those inconveniences. But they remain inconveniences, and demand attention!

Danny,

Follow me down this path if you will, and see if you find any interesting rocks and trees and vistas.

When I look at the word "authority" I see that it comes from "author." Author implies "source." I am the authority over the words I've written, the ideas I've expressed. Which is not to say that I can make them true, for I can be as foolish and mistaken as anyone. But I am the authority you would go to to find out what I meant in penning a certain statement for instance. Or making a request of me to reconsider an idea and perhaps rephrase something I'd written.

Some believe in a god, some magical guy who can see everything, has made everything in the first place, and who can ultimately control all of all of all. If such an entity exists it would be obvious that he/she/it could properly be called "the author" and hence would have "authority" over all.

Others, myself included, believe that life has, by some quirk of reality that is not known and not pertinent to this discussion, somehow or other come into being, and that the process of evolution has spawned ever newer and more diverse life forms and individual entities within those forms. One could argue, I guess, that each individual entity is a separate life form if one was to make his categorization scheme narrow enough. In fact, now that I've said it, that pretty much explains the concept of individual sovereignty. Each living thing is it's own. It's its own authority. No one is exactly like Danny and so no one else can know better than he what is right for him. Even if he is mistaken as to what is right for him, no one else can make a serious claim as to having better knowledge or reason to make different choices than Danny himself chooses to make, for only Danny knows what makes him happy.

So each of us is his own authority. To claim that one must appeal to an authority is therefore an oxymoron. In the case of several individuals who have differing views on things and who find themselves in conflict, who is the authority? Each. There can be no other if one respects the idea that each individual life is it's own.

In a conflict then, how do we resolve the issue? We can resort to discussion and reasoning and bargaining. That is one way. Or one of the individuals may have superior strength or intellect and basically force the others into compliance. That's another. Do either of these alternatives confer or transfer authority?

Let's assume that reason and persuasion rule the day and I decide that while I disagree with you I also see that you have a good point and I respect you and so I choose to grant you all or enough of your desires such that the conflict is amicably resolved. Has authority changed hands here? I am still the author of my choice to concede to your desires in the issue, no?

And if I decide you are an ass and I beat you to a bloody pulp and take what I want and leave you defeated and bruised, does that make me the "authority?" I suggest that even though defeated, you still are the authority over your thoughts, desires, choices and actions. You did choose to challenge my claims and attempt to defend your position, after all. There was no "greater authority" to go to to make that decision for you. Even if you had gone to another for advice, you would ultimately be the one to make the choice, so there is no getting around it, you are the authority as pertains to your life.

I suggest to you then, that there are no authorities. There are only people and each is different, with different ideas, dreams, capabilities and foibles. To grant that there is an authority is to demean each and every person and the very idea that life is precious. And that is what the idea of "legislation" does. It makes the presumption that there is something higher than the individual. This is the very idea which so many revere in Jefferson's "Declaration of Independence." That all flows out from the individual; the individual is the highest point of reference.

Now all of these fine words do not at all suggest that there will not be conflict, even violent conflict. And in a case of conflict one must examine, in one's own authority, what course of action to take. Defense, even to the death of the other, is one option. Walking away is another. Attempting to reason, is a third. Seeking the support of others in one's defense is yet another. In this case one must convince these others of the nature of one's claim so as to gain their support. Each of them is his own author, authority, and must make his own decision as to which party in the dispute is out of line. But I suggest to you that there is no "greater authority," or "authority" with a capital "a," to make the decision.

Another option is, as with the Somali Xeer system, that each of the parties seek the council of others and come together peaceably with the willingness to submit to a court for resolution. In that court respect is given to the process and to the idea of fair and impartial weighing of all of the issues as they pertain to not only the two in conflict, but also how they might also affect the social structure of all in the greater group. One can do this without needing a "greater authority." One simply makes his own decision to submit to the process and to accept the judgement, or not to if he finds it in egregious error. It is still the individual's authority.

And if the judgement of such a convened body of arbiters comes to a conclusion that the aggrieved party is unwilling to bear, what then? He has the choice (it is his choice, always, for no one can make another's choice for him) to ask for an appeal, or he can become violent, or he can decide that he no longer wishes to live in the company of "people such as this" and can go off to find another community with which to try and develop a relationship. Or, of course, he can try and make it on his own.

Being the social creatures we are, living on one's own is very rare and very rarely successful. This single fact is an important consideration which leans heavily in favor of arbitration. Arbitration is about relationships. (Without a relation with another there is no other with which to enter into arbitration!) One may feel "right" about a certain issue and yet be willing, for the greater good one receives from the entire relationship, to concede to another, or to others. Still, the individual is the author of this choice.

There are no "authorities."

Legislation presumes a superior position and is therefore anathema to respectful relationships between equals.

Do not confuse legislation with societal norms. Norms are just that, they are the "normal" way things work. There are deviations from all norms. Ben and Jerry's "Chunky Monkey" ice cream is one such deviation. Thankfully! So is Apple the computer. And Lenny Bruce.

Let me also suggest this. The error in thinking is when "society" is viewed as an entity of it's own as opposed to an aggregation of individuals. You may suggest that there are societal norms and so it makes sense to legislate these to enforce what "society" considers to be correct behavior. But this is a false notion. Unless there is a complaining party, there is no complaint. We do not need legislation to right wrongs. Each and every person is an author. Any person aggrieved has standing to seek resolution. There does not need to be a fictional "society" to bring action. Indeed, the very idea that "society" can have a greater good than the individuals who make up that society flies in the face of simple reason. What, pray tell, is the purpose of "society" if not to enhance the lives of those who make it up? If society was best served by eating all of it's members, in what way would this society be better off when it no longer had any of it's constituent members? Can there BE a society with no members?

Conveying some magical power on "society" does not enhance justice, it demeans it. Wars are between societies, after all, not between individuals. This is an important idea.

- NonE

So there's a lot in there...I'll do my best to respond to what I took to be the key points.

The first idea seems to be that in supposing that someone has authority, I "demean each and every person and the very idea that life is precious." This is because in any given case, "there is no "greater authority," or "authority" with a capital "a," to make the decision." Rather, it seems like you think that each individual must be allowed to decide for himself how he thinks a dispute should be resolved.

There are a few problems with this view, as I see it. The first is that you don't appear to be operating within the moral system that generated the idea of authority in the first place. That moral system presupposes that individuals ought not to coercively interfere with others' lives unless impartial justificatory reasons can be given in favor of the coercive action. Moral authority, in that system, is seen to be the embodiment of those impartial reasons: When we say that I "have the authority" to take my stuff back from you, even if it means going into your garage, what we have in mind is that ordinarily I ought not to go into your garage, but the circumstances at play in the situation serve as reasons which can legitimize my actions. Without that authority, I would need to let you go about your life unimpeded.

Taking this view a step further, we can see that when we say that someone "is" an "authority," what we mean is that this individual is in a position in society which justifies her in doing things which might not be legitimate if done by others. That is, the robbery justified my actions in the example above; an "authority" draws her justification from her social status. For this reason, a jury is justified in leveling punishment against someone, whereas a random guy on the street is not.

I say that you aren't operating in this tradition in light of this statement:

Quote:

And if I decide you are an ass and I beat you to a bloody pulp and take what I want and leave you defeated and bruised, does that make me the "authority?" I suggest that even though defeated, you still are the authority over your thoughts, desires, choices and actions. You did choose to challenge my claims and attempt to defend your position, after all. There was no "greater authority" to go to to make that decision for you. Even if you had gone to another for advice, you would ultimately be the one to make the choice, so there is no getting around it, you are the authority as pertains to your life.

This is entirely beside the point. The question is not whether getting someone to do what you want makes you an authority over them. The question is whether or not you can justify making someone do what you want. "Authorities" are precisely those people who are justified in doing that. By saying that there is no authority, you commit yourself to pacifism if you operate within this view, not to moral subjectivism as you seem to be arguing.

It's critical to note that in my previous posts, where I talked about "authorities," I made sure to highlight that those individuals were in their positions because of power vested in them by others. I wrote, for example, that "Rules can be set...by the mandate of a recognized authority in a society where such authority is respected by those affected by it." I also don't believe in the idea of sovereign authorities who draw their power from divine will or force. But that doesn't commit me to the position that no one can be an authority.

Going further, I don't think that you believe that no one can be an authority, either. You again bring up the example of Somali Xeer, noting that:

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...each of the parties seek the council of others and come together peaceably with the willingness to submit to a court for resolution. In that court respect is given to the process and to the idea of fair and impartial weighing of all of the issues as they pertain to not only the two in conflict, but also how they might also affect the social structure of all in the greater group.

But why seek this counsel? Why, to drill deeper into the specific Somali customs, do individuals agree to accept the decisions rendered by their agent, the ojay? Why does the involved party's family network, the jilib, feel compelled to recognize this decision? How can one answer in any way besides, "Because the traditional dispute resolution system lends authority to the pronouncements of the judges"?

You may object that in the case of Xeer law, the authority of the court does not include any policing mechanism to force people to go along with the rulings of the court, and in a sense this is sort of true. But Spencer MacCallum notes that:

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...in order to assure that compensation will be forthcoming even in cases where the perpetrator is a child, or penniless, or crazy, or has fled abroad, the Xeer requires that every person be fully insured against any liability he might incur under the law. If an individual cannot make the required payment, a designated group of his kin is responsible.

He continues:

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If the family tires of bailing out a repeat offender, they can disown him, in which case he becomes an outlaw. Not being insured, he forfeits all protection under the law and, for his safety, must leave the country.

So yes, it’s true that individuals in Somalia are permitted to decide their own fates. But to say that they are not coerced into accepting the court’s ruling is to bury your head in the sand. Somalia lacks a police force for enforcing justice, but justice is nevertheless enforced. And the catalyst for the enforcement mechanism is without question the court system, which is seen as possessing the authority to make pronouncements that justify the use of otherwise illegitimate measures against people.

The core of your confusion seems to come from the fact that you seem to think that forcing someone to choose between bowing to authority and fleeing a society is not a form of enforcement. You write:

Quote:

He has the choice (it is his choice, always, for no one can make another's choice for him) to ask for an appeal, or he can become violent, or he can decide that he no longer wishes to live in the company of "people such as this" and can go off to find another community with which to try and develop a relationship.

But a moment of introspection would surely reveal that confronting people with this choice is a form of enforcement in itself. The choice in a society that you would condemn would likely be, “Accept the authority’s judgment, utilize one of the authorized methods for disputing that judgment, or get violent.” But somehow you seem to have come to the view that the authority- and enforcement-character of the situation disappears when the choice becomes, “Accept the authority’s judgment, utilize one of the authorized methods for disputing that judgment, get violent, or leave.” I’m just not seeing from where you could possibly be getting this idea.

That being said, I do think that there’s an interesting philosophical problem with enforcing justice in the absence of “objective” authority. Within the philosophical tradition from which the political concept of “authority” comes, one needs impartial justification for coercing, and in the case of enforcement of the law, it can sometimes be the case that no impartial judgments will be possible (in light of fundamental differences in values). I’ve written about this problem here, here, and here. But there’s an important difference between recognizing a problem to which you don’t know the answer and supposing that there is no answer to the issue. By insisting that there can be no legitimate authority, you replace skepticism with nihilism. But although there is a genuine philosophical tension, cultures throughout human history have unanimously agreed that one needs a way to authoritatively adjudicate disputes so that one need not resort to violence, separation, or animosity. And so the have found a way around the problem, whether through arbitration procedures, courts, or regulations.

I can’t help but feel like this response was a little rambling and disjointed, but I’ll just have to chalk it up to a long week. Hopefully something in there made sense!

Danny,

I think you are making a confusion here. You suggest that the choice to accept a judgement or leave is an enforcement action. I disagree. You see, it is only if one wishes to remain in the company of the given society that one could view banning as an enforcement. If the people with whom you want to associate do not want to associate with you on the terms that YOU set (by your actions), then that is simply their free choice of association. You seem to think that anyone has an inherent right to associate with others whether those others concur. I disagree. It is all voluntary.

(Let me add here, that I don't see the Somali system as one of perfection, nor do I suggest that there are not potential problems with it especially in a global society. However, I see it as morally heads and shoulders above the other systems of which I'm aware, and so I hold it as a model for study.)

- NonE

So let me try to understand. Are you suggesting that the United States government, for example, would be a completely voluntary institution if, whenever it was about to use coercive force, it said, "Instead of complying with our rules, you can leave the country"? If you would be completely okay with legislation, so long as legislators always offered the option of deportation, then I would say you're more comfortable with the exercise of power than I am!

In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek writes:

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By "coercion" we mean such control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in order to avoid greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another. Except in the sense of choosing the lesser evil in a situation forced on him by another, he is unable either to use his own intelligence or knowledge or to follow his own aims or beliefs. Coercion is evil precisely because it thus eliminates an individual as a thinking and valuing person and makes him a bare tool in the achievement of the ends of another.

If you look closely, you'll see that Hayek is careful not to identify coercion with the use of physical force, but rather extends the notion broadly to include anything which forces someone into acting according to the plans of others in order to avoid some great evil. This idea is captured in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty as well:

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Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.

Emile Durkheim echoes this sentiment in his The Rules of the Sociological Method:

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If purely moral rules are at stake, the public conscience restricts any act which infringes them by the surveillance it exercises over the conduct of citizens and by the special punishments it has at its disposal. In other cases the constraint is less violent; nevertheless, it does not cease to exist. If I do not conform to ordinary conventions, if in my mode of dress I pay no heed to what is customary in my country and in my social class, the laughter I provoke, the social distance at which I am kept, produce, although in a more mitigated form, the same results as any real penalty.

All of these are, in a sense, forms of enforcement. And because of their inherently coercive nature, and due to the prima facie discomfort that liberals feel towards coercion, it seems reasonable to expect that thinkers within that tradition would want some kind of justification to be offered in favor of these forms of enforcement. Authority is just a way of talking about justifying that enforcement. People cannot legitimately enforce without the authority to enforce. That's just what "having authority" means! It means "being justified in doing things which would normally be unacceptable." Let me say it again: Enforcement behaviors are coercive. Coercion is prima facie wrong. Coercion can be legitimated with morally justificatory reasons. Someone who can offer morally justificatory reasons in her defense has the authority to coerce.

This idea of authority need not, as you repeatedly insist, involve the positing of special status to one individual over another. In his Second Treatise on Government, Of Civil Government, Locke writes:

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And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For the law of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders; and if any one in the state of Nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.

Now, I don't necessarily agree with Locke's idea of what the law should be expected to do, or how it should be enforced, but that's not the point here. The point is that so far as justice is legitimately enforceable, it must be the case that someone (or everyone) has the authority to enforce it. Locke thinks that in the state of nature, we all have equal authority to enforce the law -- that the fact of a violation itself serves as a morally justificatory reason for coercion, and therefore everyone is authorized to enforce justice. Others have argued that we have procedural rights, and therefore can only be brought to justice through certain "fair procedures" in order to avoid the problems associated with vigilantism. Those people would think that authority does not reside with just anyone, or at least that individuals would need to follow certain rules in acting on their authority. That's an argument that can be had, but the point is that however you come out of the debate, there still needs to be authority.

But it sounds like you actually agree with this, in spite of your insistence to the contrary. You write:

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As to your suggestion that some cop is entitled to go into the garage and reclaim my stolen property and yet I am not... this makes no sense at all. From whence does this cops justification come if not from the person who is the only real claimant against the injury?

In saying this, you seem to suppose that the problem with what you allege to be my view (even though I never said anything of the sort) is that I place the authority to enforce property claims in the hands of the policeman instead of the owner of the property. But in saying this, you imply that the owner of the property has the authority to enforce his claim.

Just to be clear, I said:

Quote:

When we say that I "have the authority" to take my stuff back from you, even if it means going into your garage, what we have in mind is that ordinarily I ought not to go into your garage, but the circumstances at play in the situation serve as reasons which can legitimize my actions. Without that authority, I would need to let you go about your life unimpeded.

There wasn't any cop in that illustration. It was the property owner going into the garage, as evidenced by the phrase "my stuff." But even if I had argued that a cop has the authority to go into the garage and the property owner didn't, your objection would not be to the idea of authority, but rather to the claim that the cop has the authority instead of the property owner.

Finally, you asked:

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...do you disagree with the part where it says, "...deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed..." ? You seem to be saying that these "authorities" of yours have a higher right than the people whom they supposedly are hired by.

But now for the third time, I wrote:

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Rules can be set...by the mandate of a recognized authority in a society where such authority is respected by those affected by it.

Let me say that again: WHERE SUCH AUTHORITY IS RESPECTED BY THOSE AFFECTED BY IT. As in, if that authority were not respected, then it would carry no weight.

In a society where voluntary conflict resolution predominates, it is a normative factor. There are always rules and authority is vested in something, even if it is only a process.