The "Authority" in phrase "Question authority" is a particularly "sovereign" authority -- that is, an entity whose claim to its authority is based simply on its social role, and nothing else. So, for example, a government that rules a people in a manner inconsistent with their political philosophy would be an authority, but one whose legitimacy should be questioned, since in the liberal tradition, governments are seen as gaining their authority from the support of the governed. The "Question authority" bumper sticker was likely created to communicate the idea that the government was not acting properly as an agent of the populous, which would cast doubt on its claim to authority. The key observation to take from the example, though, is not that authority is always illegitimate, but rather that illegitimate claims to authority should be questioned, and those who make them should be driven from power.

Your next point notes that if individuals voluntarily comply with others' intentions, then there is no coercive exercise of authority; as we can see from Hayek's definition, if a person acts according to her own plans, then she is not coerced, even if others wanted her to act that way as well. On that we agree. But going back to Durkheim (same book as above):

Quote:

Undoubtedly when I conform to them [social rules] of my own free will, this coercion is not felt or felt hardly at all, since it is unnecessary. None the less it is intrinsically a characteristic of these facts [that they are coercive]; the proof of this is that it asserts itself as soon as I try to resist. If I attempt to violate the rules of law they react against me so as to forestall my action, if there is still time. Alternatively, they annul it or make my action conform to the norm if it is already accomplished but capable of being reversed; or they cause me to pay the penalty for it if it is irreparable.

Another way to advance Durkheim's point is that the slave who accepts and embraces his fate is nevertheless enslaved, but the coercive nature of his bonds asserts itself only to the extent that the slave resists.

And so it is in resisting the intentions of authorities that the coercive aspects of their actions reveal themselves. As I said before, an authority is someone who has moral justification for using force; alternatively, one could say that someone has the authority to use force if she has moral justification for her actions.

So to apply this idea back to the example with the stolen property in the garage, we can see that there would be no wrong done if the stolen property's owner went into the garage with the consent of the garage's owner. The important question arises when the garage owner resists the invasion of his garage; it is then that the coercive nature of the stolen property owner's actions becomes apparent. And as liberals, we want to say that coercion is prima facie wrong. Because the stolen property owner has acted coercively, we ask, on what authority did she enter the garage? The justification she would offer for her authority would be the fact that the garage held property that had been stolen from her.

So because the stolen property owner had the authority to do what she did, it would then become prima facie wrong for the garage's owner to try to stop her -- we would ask on what authority he obstructed her. He would offer that he was defending himself and his property, which is something which normally grants authority to an act of coercion. But because he was a thief, and because he was defending himself against someone who had full authority to act as she did, we would say that he was wrong to try to stop her from acting on her own plans (though we might not condemn him if he didn't know who she was, for example).

Do you see how the moral system is supposed to work, and how the concept of authority plays into it? It really isn't that bold of an idea!

No.

- NonE

Hmm.

Okay, I'll try another way:

1) Coercion is prima facie wrong.

2) Coercion can be justified if morally weighty reasons can be offered in defense of the coercive action.

3) If and only if someone can offer morally weighty reasons on behalf of her coercive actions, we shall say that she "has the authority" to engage in those actions. (As in, she is acting on the moral authority of the reasons; the reasons lend moral authority to her actions.)

Does that make sense up to that point?

No. I still reject the idea of "authority." You could just as easily use the word "right" in that last paragraph, couldn't you? The use of the word "authority" simply inserts an idea that is confusing and irrelevant. By doing so you are bringing in "society" where there is no "society" (as an entity), there are only the individuals involved. The use of the word obfuscates the issues.

- NonE

Gort,

Yeah, I think you're missing something. Or rather, the questions that you are asking me are the issues I addressed in a very long post a day or two back, and so if you care to go back and read my thoughts perhaps we will have more of a basis for discussion.

Okay? ;-) [and thanks for BUTTing in, Danny gets to be a broken record, almost as bad as NonE does, if you know what I mean.]

- NonE

NonE,
If I might appear initially to be confused by my questions using words you've declared confusion, hopefully contextually, if you'll bear with me, my reason for doing so will come:

Do the two or more individuals authoring and signing (to)* a voluntary contract, by doing so transfer, limit, reduce or grant any individual 'authority'? Or are there any 'rights' (as actions granted) inherent in the contract stipulations? Is there any 'should' or 'ought' (inherent? implied?) in contracting?
If not, might you explore a bit, relative to contracting what words you feel would better serve in their place?


* by 'signing' I include non-script forms eg handshakes/verbal as signs

We don't like your kind, 2i2!

- NonE

Strike-the-Root.com just brought me a wonderful article which goes straight to the heart of this matter. I offer it as another perspective from which to examine the issue. (From a past issue of The Voluntaryist... thank you to Carl Watner!)

Grant No Man the Authority to Make You His Slave
by Peter Ragnar

And I suggest that one consider the question of whether a man may authorize his own slavery. I think you'll find that it is an impossibility, for none but the person himself is ever capable of that internal dialog from which acquiesence springs.

- NonE

The "Pirate Bay" trial is looking like a lot of fun. This last article I read screams out to be a part of the discussion here regarding "authority."

Enjoy.

- NonE

I certainly see where you're coming from, and have at least a working familiarity with the Misesian, (David) Friedmanite way of approaching these sorts of issues. It's not that the position is incomprehensible. It's just that if we don't think of individuals as "recepticles for wellbeing" and ourselves as worthwhile only because we can be well-off, then it's not entirely clear why we should care about "the good of society" and not just "our own personal good" if we don't think that people are genuinely valuable in themselves. And if we think that people are valuable as individuals, then it seems sort of weird to think that we would be comfortable treating them in just any way -- it seems reasonable to think that there would be appropriate and inappropriate ways to treat people, even if we can't rigorously and scientifically determine what we mean by that. But if you agree that there are appropriate and inappropriate ways to treat people, then you've arrived at a pretty normal conception of justice, and abandoned the Misesian position. So I never really got it.

It's just that if we don't think of individuals as "recepticles for wellbeing" and ourselves as worthwhile only because we can be well-off, then it's not entirely clear why we should care about "the good of society" and not just "our own personal good" if we don't think that people are genuinely valuable in themselves.
I don't think most people are genuinely valuable 'in themselves', anymore than I think coffee or cats are. I happen to like liberal conflict-free societies (partly because I'm a natural iconoclast, and thus wouldn't do well in a totalitarian system). I also have no desire to run other people's lives much less 'improve' them, neither from any sort of benevolence but because other people's lives are simply not important enough to be worth my time, energy or thought. So the primary restraint I have with regard to 'reformism' which infects so many intellectuals is that I positively don't give a damn about what I see as, largely, a bunch of ignorant and often incompetent people ruining their own lives. I only have a problem with that ignorance intrudes on my life.

Much of my difference with statists and libertarians stems from the fact that I have what you might call a Nietzschean view of people, I don't have positive or negative feelings about most people or relationships because I hardly ever think about how they feel, and certainly don't feel any 'responsibility' towards them. The fact that the average human has emotional and cultural blocks that keep him from adopting a similar mode of thought and conduct is obvious enough, and it is an obstacle to the establishment of what we might consider a thoroughly liberal society. But since I am not, as I have said, any sort of 'reformer' or revolutionist, but an insurrectionist, I don't consider that to be my problem. I have put precisely zero dollars and zero minutes trying to 'spread libertarianism'.

But hypothetically adopting your standard for a moment (and adopting a different worldview myself), I see no reason that I should care in the slightest bit about what you think. I guess it's nice to know that you prefer free, liberal societies, but so what? I would prefer to have my interests funded by the government, and since I'm in a social group which benefits more from the existing establishment than I would if we radically remade society right now, I'm much happier keeping things the way they are now. Enjoy your lack of power; you're irrelevant.

See how that's...disgusting? (Pumping an Aspie's intuitions seems like a stupid thing to do, but I'm doing it anyway!)