(Dis)solving the question of Free Will vs. Determinism

the Free Willers that I have talked with and seen in action want an exception to the causality that pervades the natural world. The natural world after all (give or take some quantum mechanical oddity) is *determined through causality*, and thus if there is to be such a thing as Free Will there has to be an exception to causality. The Determinists hold that this is a cop-out: if everything we know in nature is determined then we cannot suddenly bring in some big exception in order to validate our cherished Free Will.

Both Free Willers and Determinists thus assume that the idea that in nature everything is determined has a bearing on Free Will: the Free Willers seek an exception to this causality and the Determinists think this is an indefensible, cowardly and ad hoc strategy. There is some truth in both of these positions, but both are fundamentally misguided. Let me start with the truth in the positions first and then explore where they go wrong:

- The Free Willers are right in saying that you cannot disprove free will (nb: lack of Capital Letters) without landing into a contradiction
- The Determinists are right that the natural sciences are about causality and determinism and that we cannot make exceptions to this when it suits us (to save Free Will for example)

Where both go wrong is in assuming that free will is anything other than either our everyday concept ('did you do this out of your free will or because you were forced?') or the *logical* (not *empirical* as it is not an experience itself, see above) precondition for personhood. Both the FW'ers as well as the D.'ers either absolutize/ metaphysicize AND/OR scientificize these two concepts of free will into Free Will, but *no meaning has been given to such a concept*: for a symbol to get a meaning (and thus to become a concept) there have to be linguistic *practices* where the rules for the application of that concept get established and this is what is sorely lacking in the Free Will concept:

other than 'randomness' (scientific concept) nobody has put forward a *meaning* of Free Will (some such as Stefan Molyneux have merely repeated the everyday concept 'free will' and then thought or assumed that this is in fact Free Will, but that does not establish what he wants it to establish (as I have argued in an earlier post) as 'free will' need not be in conflict with causality and hence determinism (practically unpredictable behaviour of complex systems)) and this is no surprise as we cannot *step outside of our free will to engage in linguistic practices in order to define it*

(so my approach is kind of like Wittgenstein's approach in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus wherein he wanted to give the limits of thought which is obviously impossible by standing outside of thought and thus he tried to delimit it *from within*. I try to do that by saying that free will is the *logical* precondition for personhood, and I try to pay tribute to Wittgenstein's later work by showing how 'free will' is *in fact used* (e.g. 'did you do this out of your own free will or because you were forced?')

this means that to then discuss Free Will becomes nonsensical since there is no meaning of the concept. it is wrong for the Determinists to deny that in everyday life we exercise our free will by making choices since this ability

is simply what free will consists in/

this is what we *call* free will/

this is how the concept is used/

this is its *meaning*,

and it is wrong for the Free Willers to assume that this ability somehow proves an exception to causality in nature since it simply has no bearing on that question.

So the Determinists can be and in fact are right in saying that in studying nature we assume causality and that there are no exceptions to this, and the Free Willers can be and in fact are right in saying that it is impossible to refute free will without landing into a performative contradiction

I think my attempted dissolution of the question of Free Will also sheds a light on the relation between the natural sciences and the human or social sciences:

- the natural sciences assume causality and the method to study causal processes is through the *empiricism*: observation and testing
- the human or social sciences operate in a different realm, one that presupposes personhood and thus free will. Here the only correct method is *praxeology*: the assumption of man as a thinking and acting creature and then deducing the logical implications of these axioms and applying them to reality.

this btw is why it is so fascinating to see some Free Willers both accept Free Will and at the same time *reject Praxeology as unempirical*. The human or social sciences *cannot* be empirical since they assume free will, the freedom to choose. In so far as we study men as men (thus as thinking and acting creatures) praxeology is the only possible method. (of course we can study e.g. biological, neurophysiological etc. spects of humans, but then we are not studying them as acting and thinking creatures, but as automatons like we study processes in the natural sciences.

The bridge between the natural and human or social sciences is then categorical and unbridgeable in a *conceptual and hence necessary way* rather than merely empirical and this is why the Determinists' hope for disproving free will through further scientific research is idle

I posted this same piece of text on this Google Group I'm part of and somebody said that this is all very interesting (and he meant it) but that he still has the fundamental question: 'When I decide to do something, do I really decide it or is it predetermined and thus is the experience of deciding merely an illusion?'

And I completely understand the objection and it has been going through my mind too, but I have this strong intuition that this question in itself simply makes no sense. But a mere intuition is not proof yet, so I'm gonna try and write about it a little later, I have to think and think some more about it.

Number of posts: 899 Registration date: 2007-08-16

Conrad wrote:

I posted this same piece of text on this Google Group I'm part of and somebody said that this is all very interesting (and he meant it) but that he still has the fundamental question: 'When I decide to do something, do I really decide it or is it predetermined and thus is the experience of deciding merely an illusion?'

And I completely understand the objection and it has been going through my mind too, but I have this strong intuition that this question in itself simply makes no sense. But a mere intuition is not proof yet, so I'm gonna try and write about it a little later, I have to think and think some more about it.

an interesting question. Does anybody think that a *struggle* to decide may be relevant here-- ie., the struggle in and of itself is what "tempers" us as individuals--even though the process of thought in the decision--and the choices involved may be-- in some way (sociologically, etc.) predetermined--and the struggle itself may be also--but the experience of the struggle sees us making ourselves ---"making up our minds"-- quite--uh--literally. (This expression came to me as I was writing it---and I remember a young girl-- 2 or 3--saying this to herself over and over--with, I imagine, a fresh sense of its oddity--or its sense as a literalization. )

Zebra Foal wrote:

an interesting question. Does anybody think that a *struggle* to decide may be relevant here-- ie., the struggle in and of itself is what "tempers" us as individuals--even though the process of thought in the decision--and the choices involved may be-- in some way (sociologically, etc.) predetermined--and the struggle itself may be also--but the experience of the struggle sees us making ourselves ---"making up our minds"-- quite--uh--literally. (This expression came to me as I was writing it---and I remember a young girl-- 2 or 3--saying this to herself over and over--with, I imagine, a fresh sense of its oddity--or its sense as a literalization. )

in the sense that our selves are contantly being 'created or changed' by the then deterministic thought processes as well?
Susan Blackmore sort of wrote about this re memetics and how you can let go off the self and then consist only of the experience of thought patterns etc. Like you ARE a river, the current, the stream, instead of a boat on it

Conrad wrote:

I like how [Nietzsche] immediately sees Free Will and its opposite Determinism as misguided concepts and so doesn't accept the terms of the debate

--Conrad, here

I find some curiosity on this topic (following a prompt on page 11 here per jawol(48) & Stewie), thus the bumpin' back up.

First, I'd ask Conrad specifically, seeing as how the quote post and these posts are from several years back, if this is still his position?

I also wanted to ask everyone about their thoughts on an article titled Determinism and Free Will in Science and Philosophy, [here]. Does this overview pretty accurately assess the topic and/or align with your position/understanding? Might you have any comment on it?

~thanks

Number of posts: 1 Registration date: 2010-05-09

Conrad wrote:

I posted this same piece of text on this Google Group I'm part of and somebody said that this is all very interesting (and he meant it) but that he still has the fundamental question: 'When I decide to do something, do I really decide it or is it predetermined and thus is the experience of deciding merely an illusion?'

And I completely understand the objection and it has been going through my mind too, but I have this strong intuition that this question in itself simply makes no sense. But a mere intuition is not proof yet, so I'm gonna try and write about it a little later, I have to think and think some more about it.

You could reply that the answer to the question depends entirely on the definitions of "predetermined", "decide" and "illusion". If these were clearly defined (particularly the first two) then there would probably be no worthwhile discussion to be had. Since you appear to like Wittgenstein, here's a quote from him:

Wittgenstein wrote:

To the philosophical question: "Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component parts?" the correct answer is: "That depends on what you understand by 'composite'." (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question.)

Or I could be way wrong. I'm rather new to this whole philosophy thing Razz

Number of posts: 514 Registration date: 2010-01-28

Welcome!

Aggryam wrote:

Since you appear to like Wittgenstein, here's a quote...
I'm rather new to this whole philosophy thing Razz

First things first, "ditto" the "Welcome!"

Then along the dots I mentally connected and tried to convey via my quote snipping... here's some quotes on your "thing":

Quote:

A philosopher is a blind man in a dark room looking for a black cat that isn't there.

--William James

You ask a philosopher a question, and they talk about it for half an hour, and at the end of the half hour you don't understand the question.

--Philippa Foot

Philosophy is the misuse of a terminology which was invented for just this purpose.

--Walter Dubislav

Philosophy, like medicine, has plenty of drugs, few good remedies, and hardly any specific cures.

--Chamfort

But again and again it seems to me that in this case, too, Schopenhauer only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing—he adopted a popular prejudice and exaggerated it. ...

--Frederick Nietzsche

Metaphysics is almost always an attempt to prove the incredible by an appeal to the unintelligible.

--Mencken

Then, the best for last:

Quote:

If, while making love, a woman says "faster" I will try. But if she says "deeper" she had better be looking for philosophy.

--unknown

again, Welcome~

eye2i2 wrote:

Conrad wrote:

I like how [Nietzsche] immediately sees Free Will and its opposite Determinism as misguided concepts and so doesn't accept the terms of the debate

--Conrad, here

I find some curiosity on this topic (following a prompt on page 11 here per jawol(48) & Stewie), thus the bumpin' back up.

First, I'd ask Conrad specifically, seeing as how the quote post and these posts are from several years back, if this is still his position?

pfff, I don't know. I briefly scanned my earlier post about dissolving the question and what not and I do sort of like the idea in that post, but doubt that it would stand up to scrutiny. The Nietzsche thing will take me too long to retrace my thoughts

Quote:

I also wanted to ask everyone about their thoughts on an article titled Determinism and Free Will in Science and Philosophy, [here]. Does this overview pretty accurately assess the topic and/or align with your position/understanding? Might you have any comment on it?

too long for me

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Aggryam wrote:

Conrad wrote:

I posted this same piece of text on this Google Group I'm part of and somebody said that this is all very interesting (and he meant it) but that he still has the fundamental question: 'When I decide to do something, do I really decide it or is it predetermined and thus is the experience of deciding merely an illusion?'

And I completely understand the objection and it has been going through my mind too, but I have this strong intuition that this question in itself simply makes no sense. But a mere intuition is not proof yet, so I'm gonna try and write about it a little later, I have to think and think some more about it.

You could reply that the answer to the question depends entirely on the definitions of "predetermined", "decide" and "illusion". If these were clearly defined (particularly the first two) then there would probably be no worthwhile discussion to be had.

one question then would be what the definitions are based on? ordinary language? philosophical theory? and could they be clearly defined at all since they're bound to be used in many different contexts?

Quote:

Since you appear to like Wittgenstein

I suddenly understand what mgeduld meant with his remark on somebody "liking" The Shining!

Quote:

, here's a quote from him:

Wittgenstein wrote:

To the philosophical question: "Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component parts?" the correct answer is: "That depends on what you understand by 'composite'." (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question.)

Or I could be way wrong. I'm rather new to this whole philosophy thing Razz

I don't think you're wrong, but you just opened truck load of cans of worms and what not

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Number of posts: 281 Registration date: 2008-12-04

Yeah I think I basically agree with your first post.

Quote:

When I decide to do something, do I really decide it or is it predetermined and thus is the experience of deciding merely an illusion?'

And I completely understand the objection and it has been going through my mind too, but I have this strong intuition that this question in itself simply makes no sense. But a mere intuition is not proof yet, so I'm gonna try and write about it a little later, I have to think and think some more about it.

I think so too. Something to consider-- is "not decided," a complete non sequitur of "predetermined"? i.e. predetermined=/=not decided?

Should the question then be turned on its head-- the burden of proof is on the person who says "not decided," does follow from "predetermined"? The burden of proof is on the person who claims non predetermination is a necessary precondition of "deciding."

Dunno if this makes any sense, just throwing it out there.

An article I found of value:
The Big Questions: Do we have free will?
18 November 2006, NewScientist.com news service
Patricia Churchland
An excerpt:

Patricia Churchland wrote:

A rigid philosophical tradition claims that no choice is free unless it is uncaused; that is, unless the "will" is exercised independently of all causal influences - in a causal vacuum. In some unexplained fashion, the will - a thing that allegedly stands aloof from brain-based causality - makes an unconstrained choice. The problem is that choices are made by brains, and brains operate causally; that is, they go from one state to the next as a function of antecedent conditions. Moreover, though brains make decisions, there is no discrete brain structure or neural network which qualifies as "the will" let alone a neural structure operating in a causal vacuum. The unavoidable conclusion is that a philosophy dedicated to uncaused choice is as unrealistic as a philosophy dedicated to a flat Earth.

To begin to update our ideas of free will, I suggest we first shift the debate away from the puzzling metaphysics of causal vacuums to the neurobiology of self-control. The nature of self-control and the ways it can be compromised may be a more fruitful avenue to understand cases [exemplified in real-life examples given in the article introduction] than trying to force the issue of "freely chosen or not".

(Dis)solving the question of Free Will vs. Determinism

(Dis)solving the question of Free Will vs. Determinism

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