Well he could just say, "Clearly we wouldn't want that rule to be adopted as a universal law, because the consequences would be horrible. Therefore, our pre-theoretical intuition that hitting people is wrong can be confirmed through application of the method I advance."

yep, but all those extra 'moral intuition/no chaos/no rational person could want it' requirements are just that, 'extra'. He needs to argue for those, rather than posit them as self-evident (and then have the guts to say that they in fact are the data used in empirical verification)

the man has got some balls, I'll give him that

damn, so... what Stewart said!

Right, so the task needs to be coming up with an example of an inflicted behavior where reasonable people could disagree on whether it could acceptably be implemented as a universal law. If you can do that, it would be a significant problem for his argument. In writing the post, I wasn't able to think of such an example, which is why I didn't make that argument. But if you can, I'd be interested in hearing it!

well, fuck that... I mean, I reject his view of moral intuitions as the data for empirical verification (and the universality requirement that he has in mind). That is so begging the question that it isn't even funny anymore. I then don´t feel obliged to come up with such examples.

I mean, if this were the natural sciences the analogous situation would be to say that e.g. gravity should be universal and it must not lead to predictions that conflict with our common sense intuitions of physics.





btw, I really liked how you put Stef's approach in a Kantian perspective, how you showed the fundamental similarities re consistency universalizability of maxims¨

I do think Stef accepts some of your points re actions vs. maxims, as UPB is a framework for evaluating maxims and not actions, and in his own eyes with this framework he proves that only NAP can be a valid theory. so that would anticicpate your criticism of actions possibly being justified by other maxims

to be sure, I personally accept the importance of moral intuitions, what I am saying is that to the extent that ethics is seen as a science intuitions should not play a role in the justification process.

i think that´s also a pretty good reason why it makes little sense to see ethics as a science

also, why isn´t the statement ´you ought not to pick your nose´a possible ethical statement? Isn´t reserving the realm of morality for ´inflicted behavior´also begging the question? Isn´t it at least something that has to be argued for and cannot just be assumed? I mean, can I not consistently say that I think anybody who picks his nose should be punished?

perhaps Stef discusses this in the book. If so, I forgot

i think it is a combination of all the factors that you just mentioned. I don't know what thoughts he has about his ideas and what feelings, what goes on in his mind, though his defensiveness is a big sign

I think that reliance on intuition is a lot less ridiculous than you make it sound. You don't need to take the position that our intuitions prove or disprove any theory in order to believe that when a theory is very clearly unacceptable on an intuitive level, we should have reason for calling it into question.

But the role of intuitions plays a decidedly different role in Stefan's and Kant's frameworks, because they are relied on for evidence of a contradiction in a theory. One way that the reliance on intuitions could be made workable (which is the one I implied earlier) would be to say that every reasonable person shares the same intuitions. It's obviously not perfect, but if every reasonable person agreed that a society governed by a particular rule would be undesirable, I think it would be strong evidence that the rule was a bad one. That's why I said it would be helpful if you could come up with a maxim involving an inflicted behavior where reasonable people would disagree about whether it would be acceptable to adopt it as a universal law.

But I want to insist that appeals to intuitions have a very important place in philosophy, and shouldn't be looked down upon for being "unscientific." Some of most important thinkers in the history of the libertarian movement have used intuitive approaches to clarify their positions and guard against rigidities that might have otherwise hamstrung their theories. Notable examples include Robert Nozick, Judith Thomson, Joel Feinberg, and G.A. Cohen. I should also point out that most libertarian theories are based on assertions of intrinsic value that are held to be, on some level, "self evident" (a claim also rooted in our intuitions).

I do agree that Stefan's distinction between "inflicted" behavior and non-"inflicted" behavior is seriously flawed, and I'll be addressing that in a future post. But I don't think that "picking your nose" would be subject to the objection. There is precedent (notably John Stuart Mill's On Liberty) for drawing a distinction between actions which do harm to others and actions which concern only the actor. Because picking one's nose doesn't do any harm to anyone (except perhaps in offending others' sensibilities, which could create a problem for the distinction), it would fall within the "sphere of liberty," and could not properly be called immoral. I don't think that distinction is completely unreasonable.

Not knowing if this afflicts other readers of this thread, but, the terms "inflicted behavior" and "non..." do not connect with anything currently in my head. And I have no desire to delve into Stefelopia to seek clarification to my curiosity.

- NonE (picking my nose discretely...)



(I know, I know... then why am I even reading a thread that purports to dissect Stefelopian idiocrisy?)

Well if I get around to writing out my objections to the distinction, I'll certainly do my best to explain what Stefan is trying to convey with the term!