relevant to this thread

G. E. Moore's famous common sense refutation of the skeptical argument was:

1) Here is a hand
2) any hand is a material object existing in space
3) the external world exists


So Moore can look at his hand and say 'I know that this is a hand[/i]

But this answer obviously does not satisfy the skeptic, the doubter of the existence of the external world. Moreover, it is an odd way of using the word 'know'. Wittgenstein writes this about it:

Quote:

18. "I know" often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. So if the other person is acquainted with the language-game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted with the language-game, must be able to imagine how one may know something of the kind. 19. The statement "I know that here is a hand" may then be continued: "for it's my hand that I'm looking at." Then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know. - Nor will the idealist; rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which is being dismissed, but there is a further doubt behind that one. - That this is an illusion has to be shown in a different way. 20. "Doubting the existence of the external world" does not mean for example doubting the existence of a planet, which later observations proved to exist. - Or does Moore want to say that knowing that here is his hand is different in kind from knowing the existence of the planet Saturn? Otherwise it would be possible to point out the discovery of the planet Saturn to the doubters and say that its existence has been proved, and hence the existence of the external world as well. 21. Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 'know' is analogous to the concepts 'believe', 'surmise', 'doubt', 'be convinced' in that the statement "I know..." can't be a mistake. And if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion. And here the form "I thought I knew" is being overlooked. - But if this latter is inadmissible, then a mistake in the assertion must be logically impossible too. And anyone who is acquainted with the language-game must realize this - an assurance from a reliable man that he knows cannot contribute anything. 22. It would surely be remarkable if we had to believe the reliable person who says "I can't be wrong"; or who says "I am not wrong". 23. If I don't know whether someone has two hands (say, whether they have been amputated or not) I shall believe his assurance that he has two hands, if he is trustworthy. And if he says he knows it, that can only signify to me that he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e. g. not still concealed by coverings and bandages, etc. etc. My believing the trustworthy man stems from my admitting that it is possible for him to make sure. But someone who says that perhaps there are no physical objects makes no such admission. 24. The idealist's question would be something like: "What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?" (And to that the answer can't be: I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language-game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like?, and don't understand this straight off.

Discuss.

Sorry Conrad. I'm not grasping the issue that apparently fills your focus. To me this is the same issue as the other thread you pointed to and I must say that I feel the same way about "the truth" as I do about "reaching infinity:" we can approach it, but we can never arrive. Which, of course, does not negate our proximity to it, but even that is realtive.

But if I am totally missing your point feel free to carry on without my distracting comments.

- NonE

the point in the Wittgenstein quote is that 'I know that the world exists' is an odd thing to say because it is not clear what doubt about this would look like: there is no language game in which such doubt has a place. It is an unprecedented way of using 'I know' which usually is used in contextx where there is doubt about something, or where you emphasize your knowledge, etc. This is how we usually use the term 'doubt' and 'to know' and this is where those terms get their meaning from. Using them in this different context, doubting whether or stating that I know that this is a hand, is very unlike using them in their normal context and it is not sure what these new uses mean

Stewart, been meaning to say this since I saw it: "That is, to me, a really perverted avatar! I like it. "

And ironically, its a guy looking at his hand. You must be qualified to handle this conversation.

Actually, only Conrad's and my Avatars don't have hands, so far in the thread. My bird'll have to imagine a real hand...

........

Anyways, a while ago I mentioned that the book "The World As I Found It" about Wittgenstein's life told in a semi-fictional way was crappy. But I've changed my mind a bit because the cool thing it does is introduce you to the characters and kinds of conversations that were likely to have been important to Witty.

.......

Further to the point here: I've got no opinion about the boundaries and assumptions of skepticism and whether or not Moore's statement is something of a refutation in a conclusive kind of logical way. But I would say that it does step right into the ground of: "Is Knowledge Possible?", or better yet "Is anything?" (Does anything exist, and does this matter).

Two things pop up for me:

1. It is handy to have some way of relating to others that you think the shit they are talking about is unreal and also inconsequential. Someone claiming that nothing exists and using this as grounds to argue a moral case or something could use a cold shower, a lesson in logic, or what is known to us laymen as a reality check **.

2. More interesting however is the possibility and indeed proclivity of people to fail at some aspect of discerning what is actual and what is conjecture/impossible/unreal, etc.. And a problem arises here because to someone convinced that there is no 'reality', Moore's proof is meaningless. Furthermore, Moore could be wrong completely, or partially.

Moore could be right about there being things that are real, but wrong about his example. Or he could be right in his example but wrong about his implications. Or he could be wrong in defining a hand as an object in space because of misperception or misconception or any number of more abstract things.

In this sense Moore's statement says nothing. But in another sense it begs the question of knowledge generally as if to say: "Look, we have to agree on something, and if not this, then nothing".

Every sense can be deceived. The mind can deceive itself. The quantity of people who agree on some aspect of what is real has no bearing on its truth (IE world is flat). Indeed, I'd argue that there is no such thing as a hand before I'd argue that the world exists because hands exist.

Where does a hand end and a wrist begin? Yadda Yadda.

Better would be perhaps: "There are sensations I seem to be experiencing and some reliability in my interaction with what I perceive to be external objects. I must assume these objects exist in order to function. I can forever suspend absolute judgment on whether they (hands and rocks, etc..) exist fully and truly (IE external world), but I cannot function unless I at least temporarily act as if they were real.

Sorry, that was all a bit lame I'm sure, and ground covered too many times, but I get annoyed with Moore's open-ended statement and even moreso with Wittgenstein's response or inquiry. I'm too willfully ignorant to get the point beyond: "Hey, Epistemology!".

(** And what is interesting about a 'reality check' is that very often when people try to convince each other of something adamantly and use terms like 'reality check' it is actually a certain kind of willful tribalism, ignorance, etc.. that is at stake, not the truth. So the person that is 'called down' from some radical idea like "Hands don't exist" would do well to keep questioning if it were productive to him, because the argument from Moore proves nothing and could be just a plea to join the pack of herd-mindedness. I think Einstein would agree.)

( Sorry: The following is a completely boring post by a tired seagull. I'll leave it as I've written it, but you'd maybe do well to ignore its nonsense )

Wittgenstein wrote:

. 24. The idealist's question would be something like: "What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?" (And to that the answer can't be: I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language-game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like?, and don't understand this straight off.

Here's what peeves me:

The 'idealist'. His question as put by Witti is "What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?", but why not just ask one of the opposites?

1. "What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?"
2. "What right have I to doubt the existence of my hands?"
3. "What right have I not to claim the existence of my hands?"
4. "What right have I to claim the existence of my hands?"

None of this has anything to do with anything but faffing around the question of reality. Argh.

I understand the language-game bit (I think) in that some of these questions have more meaning experientially and some have less and are more based on the quality of 'being able to be asked because of the nature of language'. Am I correct?

Still, it does nobody any good at all to care at all what an idealist would claim about knowledge of reality because of their idealism. Its like asking what kind of teacups look good in New York for a baseball game in Miami. Clearly I'm missing something.

O.K., I'll try again. If you doubt the existence of your hands, then the doubt is already in you. It doesn't matter what you feel you have a right to 'not doubt' unless that informs you before the question is raised in the first place. But again, if you doubt it, you doubt it and morality can stuff it.

I guess I partially get what Witti is suggesting: That we can simply dismiss questions of the existence of hands because it falls into what he calls the language game. Good on him not to waste his time with silly questions. Bad on him to not just lead with:

"Do we have to (in terms of debate) question whether hands exist or can we just ignore the question because of previous arguments?"

So that's why the pooch has that pensive, "I'll have a smoke after this hand-job orgasm" look going on... (is that what they mean by "the unseen hand"??) [surely Conrad's not practicing pooch proctology!?]
Here here!! for oppossable thumbs!

Everything which exists must exist as something, all objects are material because materiality is nothing but having properties within the Universe. One can doubt the existence of a particular hand, or even all hands, but if you yourself exist in any way to affirm, deny or observe something an external world exists; moreover you are necessarily a part of that world by the very fact that you can observe it (even if inaccurately). Solopsism and skepticism annoy me, because I don't think 90% of the people making arguments for them have even bothered to think about all the obvious counterarguments; such as the logical fact that anything which has properties is material and exists in some mileue. Even if your mind were the totality of the universe, whatever components cause it to operate nonetheless have a real, material existence. The notion of a non-material object with properties or infulence is just as nonsensical as an object with no properties which has material existence, matter and an objective universe are logical equivalents of any sort of existence whatsoever.

hey, anyone who doubts there is an external world, and thinks everyone else is just a figment of their imagination, should be fine with me trying to kill them, right? I mean, if I get a big knife and swing down at them, they shouldn't reach up to try to stop me, right? Since, after all, figments of your imagination can't hurt you, now can they? (unless these dimwits are going to go into horror-film fiction, where you can "die in your sleep", as in A Nightmare on Elmstreet).

People who have lost hands experience phantom hands.
Yes, this post is immature and stupid. but thats me.

I think any question is fair. If it is not, is it possible that it is not a question, but rather a statement?
I find that the staff at the teenager's (who reside with me) school are always asking questions that are actually statements. How is a person to deal with this?
Example
"You want to succeed in life, don't you?"
"You don't want to get behind in your work, do you?"

It seems many of the sages offer that 'answering' such (or even questions in general) with a question proves wise, no?

"You want to succeed in life, don't you?"
=
"What is your meaning of 'succeed' and 'life'?"


"You don't want to get behind in your work, do you?"
=
"Would you clarify for me once more what the goal of such 'work' is?"

(sadly, of course, the too typical 'adult' out eventually is: "Because I said so!")